Hegseth Prioritizes Form Over Substance - Appearance Over Competence as the New Standard for Successful in His "Woke Military.”

Here, the Old Colonel has cherry picked some passages from the following length WaPo article to illustrate why I believe our “War Secretary” Hegseth has prioritized form over substance and appearance over competence as the new standard for being “successful” in his “woke Military.”  This only reinforces my opinion of him as expressed in my previous June 2026 Blog article: “Pete Hegseth, Arguably the Worst Secretary of Defense in the past 76 Years, Is Busy Replacing Our Military’s Most Competent Leaders with Clearly Inferior Replacements” at: https://old-soldier-colonel.blogspot.com/2026/06/pete-hegseth-arguably-worst-secretary.html

 

Opinion by Theodore R. Johnson

‘No more beardos’: Appearance trumps performance at Pentagon

Hegseth’s meeting with generals and admirals missed the real opportunity in gathering leaders. 2 October 2025“… Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth convened hundreds of admirals and generals this week for a mandatory address.… ‘It’s completely unacceptable to see fat generals and admirals in the halls of the Pentagon,’ he admonished the room. He warned that there was no place for ‘superficial individual expression’ and grooming would be closely scrutinized: ‘We’re going to cut our hair, shave our beards and adhere to standards. … No more beardos’….The day’s call to action was fitness for duty, in appearance more than in performance. …. for this administration, looking the part is a job prerequisite and a preoccupation. President Donald Trump has a long record of prioritizing appearance and eager complicity over experience and competence. For his second term, he tapped telegenic politicians, conservative media stars and uncritical loyalists for vital appointments. Hegseth is cast in this mold …. Hegseth said the military should be apolitical but laced his speech with partisan barbs. …. He justified firing several commanders and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not for poor performance, but by charging that their success was due to a flawed culture “created by a previous president and previous secretary.’ …. The preferred physical attributes and politics of this Pentagon’s model soldier were much clearer after a speech that was sold as not caring about either. …. the decision to convene hundreds of military leaders for a lecture on appearances was a missed opportunity. It had the look of something more impressive, something more consequential. Instead, it was mostly superficial individual expression and an attempt to leverage the military’s war-fighting culture for a political and partisan culture war.”

Like I warned at the beginning, I would cherry pick some passages that supported my argument from this very long WaPo article but I have included the link to the complete article here for those interested in reading it:

Opinions | ‘No more beardos’: Appearance trumps performance at Pentagon

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/10/02/hegseth-military-generals-meeting-haircuts/

The Old Colonel’s closing observations:

It's a good thing Secretary of Defense Hegseth wasn't the Secretary of War during World War II or the Pacific War would have gone on for at least another two years and required a US invasion of the Japanese home islands with a tremendous loss of life on both sides. Lieutenant General Leslie Groves was the indispensable man developing the Atomic bomb that shortened the War and saved lives but he was also at least 100 pounds overweight so Hegseth would have cashiered him out of the Army before the Manhattan Project ever got started.  While brilliant scientists designed the physics, Groves provided the massive industrial scale, security, land acquisition, and relentless management required to turn a theoretical concept into a working weapon in just two years. The Secretary of the War’s (now Secretary of the Army’s) estimate of allied causalities of a “home island” invasion was up to 4 million casualties including as many as 800,000 killed. On 18 July 1945 President Truman had met with his Joint Chiefs and decided to order 766,000 troops to prepare to invade Kyūshū beginning 1 November of that year. This prompted the War Department to order 500,000 Purple Heart medals, a stock pile still being used today. General Groves truly was the Indispensable Genius that resulted in success. He was the exceptionally brilliant logistical and engineering mastermind that before taking over the Manhattan Project, successfully managed the construction of The Pentagon in record time and oversaw hundreds of concurrent military building projects involving a million personnel. His management capabilities far outweighed any concerns about his physical fitness or weight but a Secretary of War Hegseth would prefer 4 Million US casualties over allowing an overweight General to remain in uniform. For an in-depth discussion about the moral issues associated with using the Bomb, see my May 2016 Blog article: “PRESIDENT OBAMA, NO APOLOGY FOR USING THE ATOMIC BOMB ON JAPAN!” at https://old-soldier-colonel.blogspot.com/2016/05/president-obama-no-apology-for-using.html?m=1

Pete Hegseth Begins Playing the "Blame Gram" About Who Is Responsible for the Loss of Afghanistan and the Withdrawal Debacle -- He Better Be Careful Because There Is Plenty of Blame to Go Around and a Lot of It Is Trump’s

 

On 19 October 2026 the Washington Post ran this below article about the utter debacle of the 2021 Afghanistan withdrawal (a polite euphemism for abandonment) in accordance with the previsions of the first term Trump negotiated Doha Agreement.  In the best traditions of revisionist historians, it seems the Trump Administration led by none other than Secretary of Defense (aka War) Pete Hegseth, Arguably the Worst Secretary of Defense in the past 76 Years who Is Busy Replacing Our Military’s Most Competent Leaders with Clearly Inferior Replacements (https://old-soldier-colonel.blogspot.com/2026/06/pete-hegseth-arguably-worst-secretary.html), really wants to begin playing the “blame game” without realizing there is plenty of blame to go around and a lot of it is Trump’s. Next below is a taste of the WaPo article and below that is comment this Old Colonel posted in the article’s comment section explaining why Hegseth is cull of crap.  ENJOY

 

Military leaders brace for release of Hegseth’s Afghanistan review

President Donald Trump focused on the deadly withdrawal of U.S. forces during his 2024 campaign, vowing to hold people accountable for decisions made under the Biden administration.

By Dan Lamothe1 9 October 2026

Current and former U.S. military leaders are bracing for the Trump administration to release its review of the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan as soon as this month, people familiar with the matter said, a move that would revive public discourse of the 20-year war’s traumatic end days ahead of the midterm elections.

The review, directed by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, includes interviews with numerous top officers who oversaw aspects of the military’s departure and the chaotic evacuation operation launched upon the Afghan government’s collapse five years ago.

The article goes on to discuss the “Blame Game” Hegseth is trying to play shifting all the responsibility for the Afghanistan airlift debacle to the Biden Administration. Between 14 and 30 August 2021, the US alone evacuated over 122,000 people from Hamid Karzai International Airport including US citizens, Special Immigrant Visa applicants, and other vulnerable Afghans.  The evacuation was completed on August 30, one day before a deadline agreed upon with the Taliban.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/10/19/military-leaders-brace-release-hegseths-afghanistan-review/

 

30-years-a-Soldier (WaPo Comments Section comment for this article)

If Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth really wants to begin playing the blame game, note this passage in this article: “Milley and McKenzie also have told Congress that Trump’s agreement with the Taliban, made in 2020 during his first presidency, to remove all U.S. troops by spring 2021 played a significant role in the Afghan government’s eventual collapse.” I wrote this Blog article back in August 2021: “The Old Colonel’s reaction to the Marine Lieutenant Colonel who resigned because he didn’t like the Commander-in-Chief’s Afghanistan Withdrawal Decision” ( https://old-soldier-colonel.blogspot.com/2021/08/the-old-colonels-reaction-to-marine.html) where I pointed out: “Remember, it was President Trump as the CinC that made the initial decision to draw down the troop strength to 2500. Anyone that has been on Bagram (Army) Airfield or BAF knows how big the perimeter is and even if we were to shrink it to just the inner perimeter (leave out the new area where the prison is) it would still take an Army Division to secure it and its two 10,000+ foot active runways with aprons. It used to take me over an hour to run around just the inner perimeter. By making that drawdown decision, Trump in effect made the decision to abandon BAF. Given the restraints of a 2500 troop strength the alternatives were try to provide an inadequate defense at BAF or withdraw to Kabul and protect the Military side of the Kabul Airport and the Military area around the US Embassy. The Military leaders correctly elected to withdraw to Kabul.” My point is if Hegseth really wants to begin the “blame game” there is plenty of blame to go around and a lot of it is Trump’s.

As for the reason for Lt Col Scheller's insubordination, it is well known inside the “Building” that both The SecDef/GEN Austin and SecDef Esper as well as CJCS GEN Milley all strongly advised against the 2500 troop ceiling and giving up Bagram (Army) Airfield but both Trump and Biden rejected that advice and issued the lawful order to draw down to 2500 boots on the ground. Scheller got exactly what he deserved and you can read my article (link above) if you care to see why.

 

 FACTS About the Trump Negotiated 2020 Doha Agreement to Abandon Afghanistan and the Biden Follow Through on the Trump Plan

Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, was Trump”s hand picked American negotiator and he signed the final accord in Doha on 29 February 2020.

Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban’s deputy leader for political affairs and head of its political office, was the group’s chief negotiator. He was the Taliban representative who signed the agreement and led the movement’s diplomatic engagement

Both the Trump and Biden administrations operated under the 2020 Doha Agreement, which committed the U.S. to withdraw all forces from Afghanistan in exchange for Taliban counter‑terrorism promises and intra‑Afghan negotiations.

Overview of the Trump Administration’s Agreement

The Trump administration negotiated and signed the United States–Taliban deal on 29 February 2020, commonly called the Doha Agreement.

The Afghan government was not a party to the agreement, which created complications in implementing prisoner releases and negotiations

Trump negotiated and signed the Doha Agreement, committing the U.S. to withdraw all forces by 1 May 2021, in exchange for Taliban promises on terrorism and negotiations.

Key terms included:

Full withdrawal of all U.S. and NATO forces within 14 months, meaning by 1 May 2021, if the Taliban met its commitments

Initial troop reduction from about 13,000 to 8,600 within 135 days

Taliban counter‑terrorism pledges, including preventing al‑Qaeda or other groups from using Afghan territory to threaten the U.S. or allies

Prisoner exchanges: up to 5,000 Taliban prisoners for 1,000 Afghan security personnel

Start of intra‑Afghan negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government

How the Biden Administration Implemented the Trump Negotiated Doha Agreement

When President Biden took office, Trump left about 2,500 U.S. troops remaining in Afghanistan, already reduced under the Doha Agreement. Biden chose to follow the agreement, adjusting the timeline but keeping the core terms, ultimately completing the withdrawal on 30 August 2021

Biden officials stated they inherited the agreement and its deadlines, and that the Taliban had warned of consequences if the U.S. did not adhere to the 1 May date

Biden’s adjustments included:

Delaying the final withdrawal date from 1 May 2021, to 31 August 2021

Beginning withdrawal on 1 May, as required by the Doha Agreement, but extending the completion timeline

Maintaining the core commitments of the Doha Agreement: full withdrawal and reliance on Taliban counter‑terrorism assurances

 

 

Is Pete Buttigieg Really Presidential Timber?

 

The Washington Post has already began touting the virtues of Pete Buttigieg before his possible run for the Presidency but there are a few thing to consider before he is anointed the savior of the Democrat Party.  For the Washington Post’s inflated assessment of his tenure as Secretary of Transportation, read this September 2026 WaPo article

Article 

Pete Buttigieg is barnstorming for Democrats. Voters are intrigued.

The former transportation secretary has become a high-demand campaign surrogate, hitting nearly three dozen states. Just don’t ask him about the White House — yet.

By Erin Cox. 24 September 2026

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/09/24/pete-buttigieg-barnstorms-country-midterms-he-weighs-2028-presidential-run/

In this article Buttigieg is identified as a "former Navy intelligence officer" so let's dig a little deeper into what qualified him to claim to be an "intelligence officer?"

Pete was identified by the press to be a “Naval Intelligence Officer” although he had absolutely NO Intel training. That’s like being commissioned in the Naval Medical Corps without bothering to attend medical school. Pete got a “political” Direct Commission through the Navy's Direct Commission Officer (DCO) program so was appointed straight to officer rank based on his political influence rather than the standard military accession process. He bypassed just about all training so did not attend standard Officer Candidate School or lengthy initial military occupational specialty (MOS) schooling prior to his commission. At the time he joined in 2009, DCO inductees only completed a condensed TWO-WEEK indoctrination before beginning their reserve duties. To polish up his resume he did go to Afghanistan for about 4 months but with NO formal Intelligence training even he described his job in country as “being an Uber driver.”

Pete Buttigieg did not complete the Naval Intelligence Officer Basic Course (NIOBC).  Because he entered the U.S. Navy Reserve through the Direct Commission Officer (DCO) program in 2009, he bypassed ALL the standard, multi-month full-time active-duty training required of traditional Navy officers.

• Different Training Track: Rather than attending the intensive 20-week NIOBC in Virginia Beach, Buttigieg fulfilled his initial requirements by attending the TWO-WEEK Officer Development School (ODS) and conducted his drill training part-time at Naval Station Great Lakes. He received NO training in any MOS let alone specialized Intelligence Officer Training.

• Pre-Deployment Training: Prior to his 2014 mobilization and 4 month Afghanistan deployment, his primary special training consisted of a short combat-skills course at Camp McCrady in South Carolina to prepare him for individual augmentee duties in a combat zone.

His lack of traditional, full-length military occupational school training is well documented in his military records, which show less than two months of active duty service prior to his deployment.

Now lets examine whether Pete Buttigieg was a success or a failure as the U.S. Secretary of Transportation

This is a matter of intense debate with critics pointing to high-profile operational crises and supporters highlighting major infrastructure rollouts and consumer protection reforms.

Major Criticisms as the Secretary of Transportation

· Crisis Management: Critics, including various Republican lawmakers and progressive figures like former Ohio state senator Nina Turner, argued that Pete Buttigieg struggled to manage widespread disruptions. They pointed to severe airline meltdowns—particularly during the summer and holiday travel seasons of 2022—as evidence of a slow regulatory response to carrier delays and cancellations.

· High-Profile Incidents: His tenure faced intense scrutiny over major national events, such as the freight train derailment in East Palestine, Ohio, and the collapse of the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore. Critics argued his responses to these infrastructural and environmental emergencies were sometimes delayed or insufficient.

· Political Narratives: Opponents often characterized his appointment as a political stepping stone rather than a role suited to his prior experience as the mayor of South Bend, Indiana, accusing him of using the federal post to elevate his national profile.

· Prior Qualifications for the Job: Pete Buttigieg’s only qualifications for the job when Biden appointed him Transportation Secretary were he was once the mayor of a small Indiana town with a population smaller than the University of Michigan Football Stadium on game day and he had traveled on a train and an airplane .. oh ya, he also proposed to his husband at an airport.

How Well Did Pete Perform as a Small Town Mayor:

During his two terms as mayor of South Bend, Indiana (2012–2020), Pete Buttigieg faced various local criticisms and political controversies regarding his policies and leadership. Critics, political opponents, and community advocates have highlighted several key areas where they argue his administration fell short:

Racial Tensions and Police Department Scandals: The most prominent criticism of Buttigieg's tenure centered on his relationship with South Bend’s minority communities and his handling of the police department.

· Demotion of Black Police Chief: Early in his first term, Buttigieg demoted Darryl Boykins, the city’s first Black police chief, following a federal investigation into unauthorized taping of phone lines within the department. The decision alienated many African American residents and led to years of community mistrust.

· Lack of Police Diversity: Under his leadership, the diversity of the police force declined. By the end of his tenure, the department was roughly 90% white, despite South Bend having a population that was roughly 27% Black and 15% Latino.

· The Eric Logan Shooting: In June 2019, the fatal shooting of Eric Logan, a Black resident, by a white South Bend police officer whose body camera was inactive sparked intense local outrage. The crisis forced Buttigieg to briefly step away from his 2020 presidential campaign to address furious residents at emotional town halls where they accused him of failing to protect the community.

· Housing Evictions and Demolitions: To address urban blight, Buttigieg launched the "1,000 Properties in 1,000 Days" initiative to repair or demolish abandoned houses. While praised by some investors, the program drew sharp blowback from low-income and minority homeowners. Many complained that the city aggressively leveled fines and rushed demolitions, disproportionately impacting historic or minority neighborhoods while accelerating local eviction rates.

· Infrastructure Disparities: Critics argued that Buttigieg's signature economic development projects primarily favored the downtown area at the expense of residential neighborhoods. Local community surveys and political opponents pointed out a sharp contrast between modern downtown redevelopment and crumbling infrastructure, such as potholes and neglected sidewalks, on the city's West Side, which had a higher concentration of minority residents.

· Crime and Poverty Rates: Political opponents often targeted the city's socioeconomic metrics during his tenure. The Indiana Republican Party regularly criticized his record, highlighting that South Bend maintained high poverty rates and struggled with violent crime levels that outpaced national averages during most of his administration.

Whether Pete Buttigieg was a success or a failure as the U.S. Secretary of Transportation is a matter of intense debate, with critics pointing to high-profile operational crises and supporters highlighting major infrastructure rollouts and consumer protection reforms.

Correcting the Record – The Colonel Hackworth Dishonest Vendetta that Drove Admiral Boorda, the Chief of Naval Operations, to Commit Suicide in 1996

 Once again, Wikipedia demonstrates its total lack of knowledge of all things Military by including this incorrect information in their bio entry of former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, USN (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Boorda )

"Boorda died by suicide ... following a media investigation into the legitimacy of his having worn on his uniform two service medals with bronze "V" devices, which indicate the awards were for acts of valor. The "V" devices are by regulation only to be awarded to personnel who performed an act of valor in actual combat, and Boorda had not served in combat."

Colonel David Hackworth was a brave warrior but it's hard to forgive him for his dishonestly hounding ADM Boorda into committing suicide because COL Hackworth was totally ignorant of the difference between what a "V" device on an award denoted in the Army/Air Force and what it denoted in the Navy/Marine Corps. Also, note in ADM Boorda’s Official Photo he is legitimately wearing the Vietnam Service Medal and the Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal attesting to the fact that he did honorably serve in the Vietnam Combat Zone.

ADM Boorda was the 25th Chief of Naval Operations and the first person to have risen from the enlisted ranks to become Chief of Naval Operations, the highest-ranking billet in the United States Navy.

ADM Boorda was distraught over a media vendetta led by COL Hackworth of Newsweek into two miniature bronze letter "V"s that ADM Boorda had worn for years on two of his uniform's service ribbons. ADM Boorda had stopped wearing the "V" devices on these service ribbons about a year before the Hackworth investigation, after being informed by the Navy that the award citations omitted the covered service included the time his ship was operating in Vietnam waters. Reports at the time of ADM Boorda's suicide indicated that his wearing of the two "V" devices on the two service ribbons had not been an intentional deception on his part, but had been an unintentional mistake that resulted from his following verbal instructions delivered to commanders during the Vietnam War by Admiral Elmo Zumwalt when he was Chief of Naval Operations, as well as conflicting interpretations and updating of Navy award regulations. Newsweek later reported that "Hackworth believed that wearing an undeserved combat pin for valor was a grave matter of honor in the military, 'the worst thing you can do.'" Unfortunately, Hackworth was ignorant of the fact that in the Navy and Marine Corps a "V" device only means the award was awarded for service in a combat zone and NOT necessarily for Valor.

Former Chief of Naval Operations ADM Zumwalt, who was ADM Boorda's commander during the Vietnam War and who verbally authorized "V" devices for Boorda and many other sailors, wrote a letter to the effect that ADM Boorda's wearing of the devices was "appropriate, justified and proper." ADM Boorda had been the skipper of a Navy ship operating in Vietnam waters and the awards covered time he was actually in a combat zone so the award citations should have included that fact. As a matter of fact, I was present in Nha Be Vietnam when then VADM Zumwalt awarded CDR Jerry Wages, the Rung Sat Special Zone Commander, the Legion of Merit with "V" device. The Legion of Merit can NOT even be awarded for Valor.

What is unforgivable is that COL Hackworth drove an honorable Navy Admiral to commit suicide because he was too ignorant to do a little research and admit he was wrong.

Here is the official DOD explanation of what a "V" device denoted in the Army/Air Force and in the Navy/Marine Corps from 1946 and during the Vietnam War and up until 2017.

During the Vietnam War, a Combat "V"(officially called the Combat Distinguishing Device) awarded by the Navy or Marine Corps did not necessarily denote valor. This created a significant distinction between the sea services and the Army or Air Force.

For the Navy & Marine Corps the "V" was awarded for both acts of valor and meritorious service performed in a combat zone. It served to distinguish a medal earned in a combat environment from the same medal earned not in a combat zone.

In Army & Air Force the "V" device was awarded solely to denote valor or heroism in combat. This policy remained in effect from 1946 until 2017, when the Department of Defense standardized the "V" device to strictly mean valor across all service branches. 

To recognize meritorious service in combat without a specific act of heroism, the military introduced the "C" (Combat) device.

To determine if a specific sea service Vietnam-era award was for valor or meritorious service, you must read the official award citation, which will state if the medal was for "heroic achievement" or "meritorious achievement/service".

______________________________________________________________________

Effective 7 January 2017 The Department of Defense overhauled and standardized its military decorations when the Department of the Navy restricted the "V" device so that it is now exclusively awarded to recognize singular acts of valor (combat heroism). Prior to this 2017 policy change, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard utilized the "V" as a Combat Distinguishing Device (or "Combat V"). This meant it could be affixed to medals not just for valor, but also to denote meritorious service or achievement while exposed to personal hazard in a combat environment.

Key Changes Implemented in 2017:

The "V" Device is Strictly for Valor: The Bronze Star Medal (BSM) remains one of the primary multi-purpose decorations authorized to carry the "V" device, but only when the individual award is given for a specific act of combat heroism.

Introduction of the "C" Device: To replace the old practice of using the "V" for combat merit, the Pentagon introduced the "C" (Combat Conditions) device. Meritorious service or achievements in a combat zone that do not involve distinct acts of valor are now recognized with a "C" device instead.

Removed From Other Medals: While the Bronze Star retained its "V" eligibility for valor, the "V" device was completely eliminated from medals that are never intended to measure combat heroism, such as the Legion of Merit and the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal. Below is the applicable sections of the original implementation orders/official U.S. Navy Guidelines (NAVADMIN 134/17).

UNCLASSIFIED
ROUTINE
R 121452Z JUN 17
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC
TO NAVADMIN
INFO SECNAV WASHINGTON DC
BT
UNCLAS

NAVADMIN 134/17

MSGID/GENADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC/DNS/JUN//

SUBJ/VALOR AWARDS AND TIMELY RECOGNITION OF ACTS OF VALOR//

RMKS/1. This message announces new administrative requirements for originating, documenting, and processing unclassified valor award submissions of the Navy Cross and below to facilitate timely recognition of deserving U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps personnel assigned to Navy units.

.

4. Valor Awards and the "V" Device.

a. Effective January 7, 2017 the "V" Device is only authorized for decorations awarded in recognition of singular acts of valor. The "V" Device is no longer authorized for awards recognizing periods of meritorious performance under combat conditions or meritorious performance while directly participating in combat operations.
b. The "V" Device is only authorized on the following Department of the
Navy multi-purpose decorations when used to recognize valor:
(1) Distinguished Flying Cross (DV)
(2) Bronze Star Medal (BV)
(3) Air Medal (Individual Action) (AH)
(4) Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (CV)
c. The "V" Device is no longer authorized on the Legion of Merit or the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal, as these two medals are not awarded for valor.
d. The "V" Device is not authorized on the Medal of Honor (MH), Navy Cross (NX), or Silver Star Medal (SS). These medals are only awarded in recognition of singular acts of valor; therefore use of the "V" Device would be redundant.
e. The "V" Device is no longer authorized as a Combat Distinguishing Device to recognize a member’s tour of duty or deployment. The term Combat Distinguishing Device will no longer be used in association with the "V" Device.

Two of the Three Heroes That Earned the Medal of Honor at the 1965 Ia Drang Valley Battle in Vietnam were U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Officers

 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 2026 Vice Sky Marshals 1970 – Same Problems - Same Fixes Needed

The philosopher George Santayana in his 1905 book The Life of Reason warned that "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." Although warned, we have fallen into this trap again with President Donald Trump's actions to stem the flow of Illegal Aliens into our Country by hiring new Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents without adequate screening or training as President Richard Nixon did in early 1970's by recruiting new Sky Marshals without adequate screening to address the spike in aircraft piracy.

In immediate response to public outrage and clear vulnerabilities in aviation security, President Richard Nixon directed the U.S. Customs Service and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to aggressively recruit, train at Fort Belvoir, Virginia and deploy nearly 1,800 plainclothes agents. This hastily assembled, inadequately vetted and poorly trained initial group were the precursor to the modern Federal Air Marshal Service.

I know because I had a front row seat in the early 1970's with the initial Sky Marshal debacle. As a young company commander at Fort Belvoir back from Vietnam about a year, I was tasked to provide logistical support including feeding them in my mess hall to the Sky Marshal Training Program that was established at Fort Belvoir in early 1971.

When President Nixon established the Sky Marshal Program, he appointed retired Air Force General Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. as the Director of Civil Aviation Security to oversee it. Although my primary job was commanding a company with a real mission, supporting the Sky Marshal Program quickly consumed a major portion of my time and included routinely having lunch (in my mess hall) with General Davis to discuss the challenges of supporting his poorly vetted Sky Marshal recruits.

Most of the recruits had been recruited from rural small town police forces where the starting Federal GS-4 salary and thrill of flying all over the World was attractive but they had little formal law enforcement training and all the arrogance and tyrant attitude one would expect of a small town sheriff. Hence, my mess and supply staff and the arrogant and “entitled” Sky Marshal recruits did NOT get along well to say the least.

Are you beginning to see some similarities between the Sky Marshals of the early 1970's and the ICE Agents of the mid 2020's?  Keep reading because you will see that President Nixon’s solution was to bring in General Davis, the right person with the right experience and temperament to fix the problem.  I understand there is a recently available General that would be an ideal replacement for Eric Ruark as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Assistant Secretary for Border Security and Immigration Policy. From the recent boneheaded actions of the DHS agencies in his portfolio, Ruark is obviously not performing so needs to be replaced ASAP. I’ll identify the ideal replacement later.

Prompted by the unprecedented global spike in aircraft piracy, culminating in the Dawson's Field hijackings where members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) attempted to hijack five commercial airliners simultaneously successfully seized four planes and diverted three of them to a remote desert airstrip in Jordan known as Dawson's Field, President Nixon was forced to take action. On 11 September 1970, President Nixon ordered the deployment of armed federal agents on U.S. commercial flights and the rapid creation and expansion of the Federal Sky Marshal program. Leading up to this incident, the U.S. had already experienced a severe domestic wave of skyjackings. Between 1968 and 1970, dozens of U.S. commercial flights were commandeered by extortionists, political radicals, and Cuban exiles demanding transport to Havana.  

General Davis immediately identified the problems with the program as these:

General Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. heavily criticized the initial Sky Marshal recruits, viewing many of them as highly unqualified, undisciplined, and poorly suited for undercover law enforcement work.

Why General Davis Opposed the Initial Recruiting Strategy

·        Rushed and Reckless Hiring: Under immense political pressure to secure thousands of commercial flights immediately, the federal government rushed the hiring process. Over 1,000 recruits were hastily brought on from various federal agencies or standard civilian applicant pools without rigorous screening.  The preponderance of the recruits came from rural small town police forces with little or no formal law enforcement training and all the arrogance and tyrannical attitude one would expect of a small town sheriff.

·        Severe Lack of Discipline: As a strict, West Point-educated military officer and former commander of the legendary Tuskegee Airmen, Davis expected absolute professionalism. Instead, he discovered that the fast-tracked recruits often lacked basic firearm competency, tactical maturity, and emotional discipline required to handle highly sensitive, high-altitude hostage situations.

·        On-Duty Misconduct: To Davis's immense frustration, early recruits were caught committing embarrassing infractions, including sleeping on flights, mishandling their service weapons, and drinking alcohol while on duty.

How General Davis Fixed the Program

Recognizing that an untrained "army" of mediocre guards was a liability rather than a deterrent, Davis drastically reformed the initiative:

·        Stricter Vetting and Standards: He implemented rigorous physical, mental, and tactical benchmarks, filtering out individuals who did not meet high-level law enforcement standards.

·        Rigorous Tactical Training: Under his oversight, the recruits were put through comprehensive training programs that laid the foundation for modern federal air marshal tactics.

·        Shift to Ground Security: Davis correctly argued that stopping hijackers before they boarded was more effective than trying to handle a shootout mid-flight. He championed the rollout of airport magnetometers, behavioral profiling, and mandatory electronic X-ray baggage screening.

Ultimately, Davis’s commitment to elite standards and systemic airport checkpoints effectively brought the 1970s skyjacking crisis to a halt.

What’s the DHS ICE Problem that Desperately Needs Fixing Today?

Following a rapid hiring surge aimed at expanding the workforce to 22,000 officers, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) faced severe backlash over its training protocols, leading the agency to officially scrap its fast-track training program and extend instruction. The controversy peaked when high-profile whistleblower reports and an Associated Press investigation exposed significant deficiencies in how new recruits were being vetted and prepared for duty.

The Core Controversies

·        Pared-Back Academy Hours: Whistleblower Ryan Schwank, a former ICE lawyer and academy instructor, testified that the agency cut 240 hours of vital classes. This reduced basic training by roughly 40%.

·        Vetting and Screening Flaws: AI screening software used to categorize recruits mistakenly categorized applicants. It misread aspirational statements or unrelated roles (like "compliance officer") as active law enforcement experience. This allowed unqualified recruits to completely bypass the mandatory 8-week in-person academy and go straight to field offices.

·        Loosened Hiring Standards: In a rush to onboard thousands of officers, ICE accepted recruits as young as 18 who lacked college degrees.

·        Omitted Subject Matter: Truncated programs eliminated or heavily reduced instruction on the U.S. Constitution, firearms safety, use of force simulation, and the legal limits of an officer's authority.

·        Elimination of Exams: Reports revealed that over a dozen practical testing exams required for graduation were eliminated to boost passing rates. 

The Government's Response

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initially denied that any hours or requirements were removed. DHS asserted that training was simply "streamlined" to eliminate redundancies and incorporate better technology.

The Policy Shift and Correction

In response to growing public and congressional blowback, the administration has initiated sweeping changes to rectify the training deficit but leaving the person that allowed all these deficiencies to exist for as long as they have is NOT the right person to see them implemented:

Reform Area	Previous "Fast-Track" Policy	Current Reform Policy
Training Duration	Cut down to a 42-day cycle	Extended to a 71-day core program
Recruitment Priority	Rapid entry of underqualified applicants	Prioritizes seasoned law enforcement veterans
Remedial Mandates	Immediate field deployment	Past fast-track graduates must take 30 days of follow-on training
Vetting Guardrails	Automated AI sorting	Targeted reviews to find and retrain miscategorized officers

 

So Who Is the Perfect Post Retirement Military General for the Job?  GEN Chris Donahue.

He should immediately replace Eric Ruark as the Assistant Secretary for Border Security and Immigration Policy within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). From the boneheaded actions of the DHS agencies in his portfolio, Ruark is obviously not performing so need to be replaced ASAP and, as proven by General Davis, it takes a Military General to whip these rogue organizations into shape and who better for the job then General Donahue?

The primary DHS operational components and agencies that should fall under the scope of General Donahue’s portfolio include:

·        U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP): Aligning strategies regarding border security, enforcement, and the facilitation of secure and orderly cross-border travel and trade.

·        U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS): Managing policies intended to maintain the integrity of the legal U.S. immigration system.

·        U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE): Coordinating interior enforcement and border-related immigration policy initiatives.

Sounds like a marriage made in heaven.

Trump's Face on New $1 US Coin and He Turns the Eagle’s Head on the Seal of the United States Back Towards the Arrows of War

 

On 5 October 1945, President Harry S. Truman changed the Seal of the President of the United States when he signed Executive Order 9646, which officially turned the eagle's head to face right, toward the olive branches of peace, instead of left toward the arrows of war. In keeping with President Trump’s 5 September 2025, Executive Order 14347 unilaterally renaming the Department of Defense the Department of War (although only as a “secondary moniker”), I fully expect Trump to turn the eagle’s head back towards the arrows (although only as a “secondary seal”). This coin will be where he rolls out his new “War” seal.

U.S. Mint to produce $1 coin with Trump’s face on it, treasury secretary says

The U.S. Mint will soon begin producing a new $1 gold-hued coin with President Donald Trump’s face on it.

July By Maegan Vazquez15, 2026 at 10:56 a.m. EDT

The U.S. Mint will soon begin producing a new $1 gold-hued coin with President Donald Trump’s face on it to commemorate America’s 250th birthday, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced this week.

The coin’s face features Trump alongside the phrase “In God We Trust.” It is encircled with the phrases “Liberty” and “1776-2026.” The flip side of the coin shows an eagle holding arrows in one talon and olive branches in the other.

I won’t bore you with the entire article but if you wish to read it, here is the link

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/07/15/us-mint-produce-1-coin-with-trumps-face-it-bessent-says/?commentID=3bf15640-13b9-4388-a524-e572ae3279fc